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In the social science literature, altruism is often seen as a phenomenon sui 
generis which requires specific theoretical tools to be analyzed (e.g., Greven 
and Willems 1994; Olson 1965; Rucht, forthcoming). We do not share this 
view. Just as different forms of collective protests, from social movements to 
revolutions, can be brought under the same rubric of “contentious politics” 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996a), we think that individual participation 
in social movements follows similar processes, regardless of the type of 
movement and regardless of the beneficiaries of the action. In the end, the 
distinction between altruistic and “egoistic” behavior depends on the pres-
ence or absence of self-interest. Political altruism, by definition, does not rely 
on private interest. The goal is not to provide individual benefits for oneself, 
but rather to improve the situation of others. As a consequence, if one admits 
that these two kinds of political behavior are different, the difference stems 
precisely from the self-interest involved and the possibility to achieve indi-
vidual gains for oneself. As a great many authors have shown (e.g., Gould 
1991; Klandermans 1997; Marwell and Oliver 1993; McAdam 1986), the 
process leading to participation in social movements is much more complex, 
involving a number of crucial factors and going through a number of stages. 
We reject a monocausal explanation of individual participation which focuses 
on one key decision based on self-interest. While rational decisions to take 
part in a social movement do play a role, other factors affect participation: 
above all, the activists’ position in the social structure, their value system, 
and their embeddedness in social networks. If that is true, altruistic and “ego-
istic” political action, as Charles Tilly argues in this volume, do not stem 
from different processes, but rest on similar causal mechanisms. 
 In considering how to study political altruism, the problem with a sui gene-
ris view is that it is based on a purely rationalist perspective which focuses 
almost exclusively on the individual benefits one gets from getting involved. 
In other words, the basic theoretical problem is that, if one appears to get no 
benefits whatsoever, then altruistic behavior cannot be grasped with a ration-
alist approach. At this point, scholars have opted for one of two solutions. On 
one hand, most have expanded the notion of rational behavior. They have 
broadened the concept of selective incentives to include not only material 
incentives, but also moral and purposive ones, as well as other individual 
rewards (e.g., Opp 1985, 1989). This solution seems not very viable in the 
light of criticisms from students of collective action (Chazel 1986; White 
1976). The danger of falling into tautology and the failure to make empirical 
statements that can be falsified suggest abandoning this path. Alternatively, 
as Olson proposed to do, the rational-choice model might be abandoned in 
favor of other theoretical perspectives in order to account for altruistic behav-
ior. Yet interests do play a role in the process of individual participation in 
social movements, at least as expressed in the actors’ intention to act. Most 
importantly, if we expunge interests from our explanations, there is the risk 
of denying that those who act on behalf of others do so out of a rational will-
ingness to act. In other words, there is the risk of overlooking the purposive 
nature of human action and of falling into an overly deterministic view of 
political behavior. 
 In sum, in this chapter we question two mistaken ideas: that altruistic be-
havior—and, more specifically, political altruism—is a form of human action 
in its own right which, consequently, requires specific analytic tools to be 
grasped; and that it ultimately depends solely on the actors’ decision to act 
altruistically. The latter point can be generalized to say that the process lead-
ing to individual participation in social movements cannot be reduced simply 
to de-contextualized interests, intentions, and decisions, but involves contex-
tual and relational factors, that is, social structure and networks. Political 
altruism, as any other form of contentious politics, is a product of social rela-
tions. 
 
Research Strategy 
 
To empirically illustrate our argument, we propose to compare participation 
in two social movements that differ in the altruistic orientation of their 
claims: solidarity and ecology movements. The latter cannot be defined pri-
ma facie as an instance of altruistic behavior, as participants stand to benefit 
directly from the outcomes of their actions. Our strategy consists of compar-
ing two movements that belong to the same family (the new social move-
 ments family) in order to isolate the effect of the principal variable of interest 
(altruistic versus self-oriented mobilization) on individual participation. In 
addition, we control for the political context by focusing on a single country: 
Switzerland. The main difference between solidarity and ecology movements 
concerns the benefits of successful mobilization. Actions carried by the soli-
darity movement benefit other persons; those by the ecology movement pro-
duce gains for participants as well. 
 We focus on two social movement organizations: the Bern Declaration 
(BD) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The BD emerged out of Protest-
ant milieus in 1970 and belongs to the development-aid branch of the Swiss 
solidarity movement. Unlike charity organizations, which provide direct aid 
to Third World countries, it seeks to inject social justice into economical and 
political relations between the North and the South. This organization, which 
has about 18,000 members, is run by a small staff of professionals (fewer 
than ten persons) on a relatively low budget. The Swiss branch of the WWF 
was created in 1961. At the beginning it dealt primarily with nature conserva-
tion. Activists were engaged in traditional areas such as endangered animal 
species, forest destruction, water pollution, and so forth. However, the organ-
ization soon expanded to new areas and added new political interests to its 
agenda. Specifically, it came to incorporate a political ecology dimension. 
The WWF has developed steadily since its founding to become one of the 
largest organizations in the Swiss ecology movement. With more than 
210,000 members, almost 100 employees, and an annual budget of 28 million 
Swiss francs, the WWF is not only one of the major organizations of the 
ecology movement today, but one of largest social movement organizations 
overall in Switzerland. 
 To analyze individual participation in the BD and the WWF, we use survey 
data on two representative samples of their members. The survey of members 
of the BD was conducted in 1993 in the context of a study on the process of 
individual participation in social movements (Passy 1998). The survey on 
WWF members was made in 1998 with the aim of allowing for a comparison 
of participation in two distinct movements.1 
 
A Model of Individual Participation 
 
Generally speaking, explanations of how and why people get involved in 
movement activities follow two perspectives. Following the route paved by 
Mancur Olson (1965), a number of scholars explain participation in social 
movements by underscoring the key role of individual interests, intentions, 
and decisions (e.g., Chong 1991; Hardin 1982; Macy 1991; Opp 1989; 
Sandler 1992). Rational choice theorists stress individual preferences as the 
critical moment along the path leading people to join a movement. Their 
accounts focus on the last stage of the process of individual participation, 
namely the actors’ decision. In contrast, scholars in another theoretical tradi-
tion have criticized rational choice explanations and stressed instead the role 
of social structures and networks (e.g., della Porta 1988; Kriesi 1993; 
McAdam 1982, 1988). According to them, participation does not stem from a 
single key decision; rather, it is the product of social relations. Both ap-
proaches have proved insightful, for they have shown, on the one hand, that 
individual preferences have an important impact on participation and, on the 
other hand, that social norms and values, structural locations, and social net-
works are crucial push-factors. However, this theoretical divide has encoun-
tered many criticisms from scholars who try to link social relations to the 
actors’ decisions in an attempt to go beyond a fragmented view of individual 
participation in social movements (e.g., Gould 1991, 1993; Klandermans 
1997; Marwell and Oliver 1993). 
 We start from these criticisms to go a step further, arguing that both the 
actors’ decisions and their embeddedness in social networks must be seen as 
part of a broader process in which each factor intervenes at different mo-
ments in time. Specifically, we maintain that the process of movement partic-
ipation unfolds in three stages. First, individuals come in cultural proximity 
with the movement, that is to say, they share norms, values, and a structural 
location which make them belong to its mobilization potential. Second, they 
come in social proximity with the movement, a process that is largely facili-
tated by the embeddedness in social networks. Such embeddedness, in turn, 
strengthens the cultural affinity and the identification with the movement. 
Furthermore, it establishes a direct contact with the opportunity to participate 
and hence allows individuals to translate their willingness to act into actual 
action. Third, before getting involved, potential participants assess a number 
of cognitive parameters in order to decide if they will join the movement and 
with what intensity. Thus, before they reach the stage of deciding whether to 
participate or not, individuals go through a complex process of construction 
of the willingness to do so. Social relations play a crucial role in this process, 
one that has largely been overlooked by rational choice theorists. 
 
Cultural Proximity 
 
Cultural proximity evokes the concept of cleavages. As Rokkan (1970) 
shows in his seminal work on European political parties, political conflicts 
are rooted in cultural and structural cleavages. Social change produces the 
structural bases for the emergence of political conflicts, but the politicization 
of the conflicts results mainly from mobilization (Bartolini and Mair 1990). 
Thus political parties, interest groups, and social movements all contribute to 
the politicization of cultural and structural cleavages. Following the way 
charted by Rokkan, Kriesi (1989, 1993) argues that after World War II a new 
cleavage has emerged in Western Europe2 which reflects two major contra-
 dictions of post-war societies: the growth of control over the population and 
the development of new technological risks that can potentially destroy the 
planet (e.g., nuclear power, genetic technology, industrial pollution). Much 
the same as for traditional cleavages, new sectors of the population mobilize 
around this new cultural and structural divide, claiming individual autonomy 
and emancipation, citizen oversight on the state, democratic control of high-
risk technology, and a democratization of society in general. New social 
movements draw their human resources largely from the new middle class 
(Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Eder 1993), in particular among the social-cultural 
specialists (e.g., teachers, social assistants) (Kriesi 1989). In addition to hav-
ing a specific position in the social structure, people who join these move-
ments display a value system that favors individual emancipation and a leftist 
political orientation (Cotgrove and Duff 1981; Inglehart 1990; Kriesi 1993). 
 According to the cleavage hypothesis, individuals who belong to the new 
middle class—and, even more specifically, to the social-cultural specialists—
and who have a value system emphasizing emancipation and a leftist orienta-
tion form the mobilization potential of new social movements. We can then 
plausibly argue that if members of the BD and the WWF share a similar 
structural position and a similar value system, the nature of protest (altruistic 
versus self-oriented) should not have a great impact on the first stage of the 
process of individuals participation. Table 5.1 largely confirms this expecta-
tion, and allows us to make a first step toward a rejection of the sui generis 
hypothesis of political altruism. Participants in solidarity and ecology move-
ments have a similar location in the social structure. The new middle class, in 
particular, is over-represented in both organizations as compared to the Swiss 
population. While 14 percent of the Swiss belong to the social-cultural spe-
cialists, they represent respectively 59 percent and 45 percent of the members 
of the BD and the WWF. In addition, table 5.1 shows that the working class 
is largely under-represented in both organizations, especially in the BD. The 
under-representation of the working class in new social movement organiza-
tions is a well-known phenomenon (Kriesi 1989, 1993; Passy 1998), and 
confirms that the mobilization potential of these movements is socially de-
termined. However, while the BD attracts social-cultural specialists in high 
numbers, the WWF has a somewhat more heterogeneous stock of members, 
for it tends to draw less from social-cultural professionals and more from the 
working class. This difference might be due to a particular strategy of the 
WWF, which often organizes summer camps for children that provide finan-
cial support for low-income families. This program would enable the WWF 
to expand its mobilization potential. 
 
Table 5.1 about here 
 
 Participants in altruistic contentious politics not only have a similar strutur-
al location, they also share a value system. If we compare the two main cul-
tural values espoused by new social movements—emancipation and a leftist 
orientation—we see  how the two groups under study resemble each other in 
this respect. First, both groups are clearly close to leftist parties, in particular 
those of the “red-green” alliance. About 80 percent of solidarity and ecology 
movement members declare themselves to be politically close to either the 
Greens, the Socialists, or both (table 5.2). Second, taking Inglehart’s post-
materialism scale to measure an emphasis put on individual emancipation, we 
see that the number of postmaterialists in the two organizations is perceptibly 
higher than among the Swiss population. Only 22 percent of the Swiss dis-
play postmaterialist values, whereas 89 percent of BD members and 61 per-
cent of WWF members declare a strong affinity with emancipation values 
(table 5.3). The latter table suggests that participants in the solidarity move-
ment are more postmaterialist than those active in the ecology movement. 
This variation can be understood in the light of the different years the two 
surveys were conducted (1993 for the BD and 1998 for the WWF). If we 
look at the national trend in this aspect of the value system, we observe a 
sharp decline of postmaterialist values in the Swiss population. As Switzer-
land encountered economic difficulties, postmaterialist values decreased 
(Brunner 1999). This trend affected the whole population, including new 
social movement participants. In fact, a closer look at the four dimensions 
included in Inglehart’s scale shows that participants in the ecology movement 
privilege the economic dimension rather than that of law-and-order, which 
explains why 37 percent among them belong to the mixed category on the 
scale. On the other three dimensions of emancipation values (gender equality, 
equal opportunities for citizens, and increasing citizen participation), there 
are no significant differences between the BD and the WWF.3 
 To summarize, we observe no significant difference between altruistic and 
self-oriented involvement with regard to the first stage of the process of indi-
vidual participation in social movements. As far as locations in the social 
structure and value systems are concerned, we cannot distinguish between 
BD and WWF members; both have a cultural and structural profile similar to 
that of participants in other new social movements, which is a pre-condition 
of mobilization. 
 
 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 about here 
 
 
Social Proximity 
 
Social networks perform a variety of functions in the process of individual 
participation (Gould 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 1998). First is 
their cultural function intervening in the political socialization of potential 
 participants. Previous participation in social networks provides individuals 
with meanings and identities which facilitate involvement in social move-
ments. Second, networks have a structural function in bridging the gap be-
tween individuals and a social movement organization. They provide a con-
crete opportunity to translate individuals’ willingness to act into actual action 
and thus play an important role in the recruitment of new members. Finally, 
social networks contribute to the definition and evolution of individual pref-
erences. The latter, in turn, lead individuals to decide if they will eventually 
participate. In our comparison of solidarity and ecology movements we focus 
on the first two functions of social networks, which correspond to the pro-
cesses of political socialization and recruitment. 
 If political altruism and self-oriented contentious politics arise from differ-
ent processes, social networks should have a varying impact on them. But if 
they are not substantially different, we should find a similar impact of net-
works on BD and WWF members. Networks should affect both the socializa-
tion and recruitment of members. Social psychologists have long stressed that 
emotions usually accompany altruistic acts, provoking a favorable reaction 
from persons in interaction with individuals who act altruistically (Berkowitz 
1972; Brehm 1966; Isen and Noonberg 1979; Krebs 1970; Piliavin and 
Charng 1990; Thorton, Kirchneer, and Jacobs 1991; Wolfe 1998). Thus imi-
tation can facilitate prosocial behavior (see Soule in this volume). As the 
chances that actions are imitated are higher in intensified face-to-face social 
interaction, we expect networks (which reflect social interaction) to play a 
greater role in individual participation in the solidarity movement (which we 
define as an instance of altruistic contentious politics), independently of their 
function. Moreover, following the imitation hypothesis, we expect imitation 
to be more important when individuals are recruited by people who are al-
ready involved in the movement. Therefore we think that the role of social 
networks in political altruism should be particularly important in their re-
cruitment function. 
 While several social psychologists emphasize the impact of emotions on 
altruistic behavior, others argue that altruistic acts are motivated by a com-
mitment to principles (Charng, Piliavin, and Callero, 1988; Chaves 1998; 
Schwarz 1977; Zuckerman and Reiss 1978). Emotions and principles are the 
two main types of motivations put forward by work in the social psychologi-
cal tradition to explain prosocial behaviors (Wolfe 1998). Principles leading 
to altruism develop in specific cultural contexts. Certain contexts yield a 
greater amount of symbolic and discursive resources which are instrumental 
in propagating altruistic attitudes. As Wuthnow (1991) points out, cultural 
repertoires facilitate prosocial behaviors. Relying on survey data, he shows 
that although Americans have little substantial knowledge of the Bible, half 
of them were able to relate the story of the Good Samaritan. This percentage 
is much higher among individuals engaged in altruistic activities. This exam-
ple suggests that religious institutions are a crucial “reservoir” of symbolic 
and discursive resources that facilitate the emergence and spread of prosocial 
behaviors in Western societies. Thus we expect participation in religious 
networks to be a major factor of socialization to political altruism; individu-
als who are part of religious networks should be more inclined to join the 
solidarity movement. 
 Table 5.4 offers a first empirical test of the impact of networks on political 
altruism. If we look at the top half of the table, we observe no striking differ-
ences between BD and WWF members in the socialization function of net-
works. In both cases, social networks impact significantly the process of 
meaning and identity construction which led individuals to join the move-
ment. Only a small part of participants were not previously involved in net-
works. If we distinguish between formal (i.e., organizational) and informal 
(i.e., interpersonal) networks, we see that the socialization function is per-
formed mainly by interpersonal networks, or by a combination of both formal 
and informal ones. Interpersonal networks play a greater role in the socializa-
tion of participants in the solidarity movement, whereas for participants in the 
ecology movement a combination of formal and informal networks seems to 
be more important. Sixty percent of WWF members were part of formal 
networks before they joined the organization, and at the same time had a 
broad network of interpersonal contacts with people sensitive to environmen-
tal issues or already engaged in the ecology movement. Only 29 percent of 
WWF members were exposed to ecology issues exclusively through interper-
sonal networks. This percentage rises to 44 percent in the case of BD mem-
bers. Their socialization to Third World issues comes from interpersonal 
relationships with individuals close to these issues or already involved in the 
branch of the solidarity movement that deals with North-South issues. Only 
36 percent of BD members got socialized through a combination of informal 
and formal networks. 
 
Table 5.4 about here 
 
 We can perform a more detailed analysis of the differences between altruis-
tic and self-oriented participation with respect to the socializing role of net-
works by looking at the type of formal networks in which members were 
involved before they joined the organization. Our expectation was that reli-
gious organizations should serve as a key network for the political socializa-
tion of participants in the solidarity movement. These networks carry sym-
bolic and discursive resources that might facilitate the emergence and diffu-
sion of prosocial behaviors. Table 5.5 shows the prior formal embeddedness 
of BD and WWF members, that is, their participation in formal networks 
before they got involved in the organization. The results do not support the 
hypothesis. No difference can be observed between the two organizations. In 
both cases, participants were heavily associated with new social movement 
networks, less so with conventional political networks such as unions and 
 parties, and even less with religious networks. The important point here is the 
strong resemblance of the embeddedness of altruistic and self-oriented partic-
ipants. Contrary to our expectation, religious networks are not a privileged 
channel for the political socialization of participants in the solidarity move-
ment.4 The only significant difference between the two groups is the larger 
proportion of WWF members that were embedded in youth and student asso-
ciations. This difference is traceable to the holiday camps that the WWF 
often organizes for youngsters; and many of today’s adult members may have 
taken part in such activities in their childhood. 
 
Table 5.5 about here 
 
 Turning to the recruitment function of networks, the bottom part of table 
5.4 shows that about half of the members in both organizations became in-
volved through this channel. Hence social networks represent indeed an im-
portant bridge between individuals who are culturally close to an area of 
interest and the opportunity to participate. Furthermore, these networks play a 
greater role in recruiting participants in the solidarity movement than in the 
ecology movement. In the latter case, other channels are more important. For 
example, a closer look to the various channels of recruitment (the organiza-
tion itself, the news media, networks, and others) shows that the media are 
much more important for the WWF than for the BD.5 This difference stems 
more from the higher public visibility of the WWF than from the distinction 
between altruistic and self-oriented nature of mobilization. A simple but 
significant indication of this explanation comes from a survey showing that 
the WWF logo is the most widely known in Switzerland after that of Coca-
Cola. The wide popularity and visibility of this international organization 
facilitate recruitment through advertisement in the media, and could explain 
the difference we observe in the recruitment function of networks.  
 The bottom half of table 5.4 also suggests that informal networks do not 
impact strongly on recruitment in the solidarity movement. This finding 
questions the contention that the function of networks, as regards the mecha-
nism of imitation, is specific to political altruism. Members of the WWF have 
been recruited mostly through interpersonal contacts (30 percent), whereas 
recruitment of members of the BD is more variegated and went through for-
mal (23 percent), informal (23 percent), or both (13 percent) types of net-
works. Thus interpersonal relationships are not prevalent in the recruitment 
process of participants in the solidarity movement. 
 In sum, our comparison of ecology and solidarity movements with respect 
to the second stage of the process of individual participation—that involving 
social networks—tends to counter the hypothesis that political altruism fol-
lows a distinct path. To be sure, some variations can be observed between 
BD and WWF members. Yet, in our view, they are too small to suggest that 
altruistic contentious politics follows a distinct route in this second stage of 
the participation process. That said, it is obvious that no organization resem-
bles another in all respects and no most similar research design can eliminate 
all differences in the variables one wants to control. The BD and the WWF 
differ, in particular, as to public visibility. The latter is much more publicly 
visible. 
 
Perceptions and Intentions 
 
The third and last stage in the process of individual participation concerns the 
decision to act, made by people who are culturally and socially close to a 
given area of contention. A great many studies have shown that individual 
preferences and perceptions are strong predictors of participation in social 
movements (e.g., Klandermans 1984, 1997; Macy 1991; Marwell and Oliver 
1993; Oberschall 1993; Opp 1985, 1989; Opp and Roehl 1990). Drawing 
from the extant literature, we can identify four cognitive parameters that 
affect the individual decision to participate: the perceived effectiveness of the 
action (Klandermans 1984, 1997; McAdam 1986; Marwell and Oliver 1993; 
Opp 1989), the potential risks of the action (della Porta 1988, 1995; Hirsch 
1990; McAdam 1986; Opp 1989; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991), the degree of 
legitimacy of political authorities (McAdam 1982; Melucci 1989, 1996; Piv-
en and Cloward 1979), and the personal availability of potential participants 
(McAdam 1988; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991). 
 First, the perceived effectiveness of the action refers to the individuals’ 
sense of usefulness of their own action in case they join a social movement 
organization (individual effectiveness), as well as of the action of the organi-
zation as a whole (collective effectiveness). If they perceive positively their 
and the organization’s effectiveness, they are more likely to participate. Se-
cond, the evaluation of the risks of the action usually occurs when significant 
risks derive from participating. Risks increase substantially the costs of the 
action and tend to form an important barrier to participation. High risks are, 
in general, absent from activities of solidarity and ecology movements.6 
These two movements make mostly moderate demands and tend to adopt 
pacific forms of action. Therefore we can ignore this aspect in the present 
study. Third, when individuals think that the authorities are unable to provide 
adequate responses to certain problems and that citizens—specifically, orga-
nized citizens—are both legitimate and capable political actors, they are more 
likely to engage in social movements. Fourth, participation in contentious 
politics depends on personal availability, that is, the amount of time at one’s 
disposal for collective action. We consider both objective (i.e., actual) and 
subjective (i.e., perceived) availability. People who have, or think they have, 
more time at their disposal should be more likely to participate. 
 Do members of the BD and the WWF score differently on these percep-
tions and intentions? Our data suggest a negative answer to this question. 
 First of all, before they got involved, both BD and WWF members had a 
strong feeling of the effectiveness of the respective organization to reach its 
goals. As table 5.6 illustrates, they perceived the organization as very effec-
tive, and this influenced their decision to join it. In contrast, their own indi-
vidual contribution was seen as less relevant in encouraging them to partici-
pate. This factor does not seem to decisively affect the decision to get in-
volved in social movements. However, as we shall see below, it does signifi-
cantly affect the degree of commitment once one has decided to participate. 
Second, the judgment of the capacity of the authorities to adequately address 
social problems in North-South relations and environmental protection is less 
negative than we might expect. Indeed, there is no significant distinction 
between the evaluation of the authorities’ capacity to act and that of the po-
tential contribution of citizens. Table 5.7 indicates that about half of the par-
ticipants do not grant legitimacy to the role of political authorities for bring-
ing about social change, while they do grant legitimacy to the role of citizens. 
However, a third of them do not question either the state’s capacity or that of 
citizens. They think that both are legitimate actors, able to provide adequate 
answers to the problems that concern them. Finally, as far as personal availa-
bility is concerned, BD and WWF members reveal similar constraints. The 
resemblance is striking concerning professional constraints: about three-
quarters of participants in both organizations have a job7 and more than half 
of them work full time.8 Thus participants have quite limited resources of 
time to be devoted to social movement activities. On the other hand, they do 
not perceive that as being very important. All said that before they joined the 
organization they thought they lacked enough free time for such activities. 
 To sum up, we do not find substantial differences between BD and WWF 
members regarding perceptions and intentions. While the various aspects we 
have examined might impact the decision to participate, members of both 
organizations evaluated these aspects in a similar fashion. This leads us to 
conclude that altruistic and self-oriented participants do not behave different-
ly in the third and last stage of the process of individual participation in social 
movements. 
 
Table 5.6 et 5.7 about here 
 
High-Cost Participation 
 
Our comparison of members of the BD and the WWF indicates that partici-
pants in political altruism do not follow a process of individual participation 
different from that in other kinds of contentious politics. We observe similari-
ty on three levels: the cultural and structural profile of participants, their 
involvement in and recruitment by social networks, and the cognitive param-
eters that affect their decision to participate. However, we may still wonder 
whether the process of individual participation varies for different levels of 
engagement. If we take the restrictive definition of altruism which Charles 
Tilly adopts in his contribution to this volume—that altruism not only implies 
benefits for the other person, but also significant costs for the actor—we may 
wonder whether a distinct pattern of involvement characterizes those partici-
pants who are most deeply involved (i.e., activists). Activists in the Swiss 
solidarity movement do not face the high risks implied in the kinds of altruis-
tic behavior Tilly refers to, but deeply involved participants invest much time 
and energy for the cause. Such commitment is very costly. In-depth inter-
views with core activists of the BD show clearly that commitment implies 
high costs for all activists, especially in their private life (Passy 1998). For 
example, one activist stated that her strong involvement in the movement 
proved disastrous for her family life. 
 In the light of the distinction between strongly engaged participants (i.e., 
activists) and those with a more marginal involvement, we can try to deter-
mine whether, when it comes to very costly participation, political altruism is 
indeed distinct from other types of contentious politics. In other words, do 
individuals who not only mobilize to provide others with collective benefits, 
but in addition bear important costs from such mobilization, follow the same 
process of individual participation as activists in self-oriented movements? 
Alternatively, is political altruism a phenomenon sui generis when it comes 
to strong commitment? To answer this question we compare once again 
members of the BD and of the WWF. In both cases, we isolated the group of 
activists from the whole sample. Activists are participants who enter an ac-
tive process of participation, either on an irregular or a regular basis (in con-
trast to participants who simply contribute financially to the organization).9 
We want to ascertain whether the three stages in the process of individual 
participation discussed above—cultural proximity, social proximity, and 
perceptions and intentions—differ between the two groups. 
 Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the results of logistic regression, respectively of 
BD and WWF activists, on a battery of independent variables grouped ac-
cording to the three stages of the participation process. They support the 
hypothesis that political altruism is not a phenomenon sui generis even in the 
case of high-cost participation. For both solidarity and ecology movements, 
social relations and the cognitive aspects related to the actors’ intention to act 
are the key factors leading to activism. As far as social proximity is con-
cerned, the findings (model 2) indicate that networks play a key role in en-
gaging individuals with the protest issue and establishing a direct contact 
with the opportunity to participate. Organizational (formal) networks, espe-
cially organizations that are culturally and ideologically close to the move-
ment, are particularly important to socializing individuals to the issue,10 while 
interpersonal (informal) networks play a crucial role in the recruitment pro-
cess. As regards perceptions and intentions, it appears that certain parameters 
are more important than others (model 3). First, a positive assessment of the 
 effectiveness of their own participation is, by and large, the strongest deter-
minant of both altruistic and self-oriented activism. The finding is especially 
interesting for the former group, for we see that action is prompted by the 
interest in bringing about social change and that a positive perception of 
one’s personal effort leads to a higher level of participation. In other words, 
contrary to Olson’s (1965) view, political altruism is performed on a rational 
basis rather than irrationally. Second, the interest in the issue affects the level 
of participation. However, as often stressed in the literature (e.g., Klander-
mans 1997; Marwell and Oliver 1993), it is not the most important factor. 
Moreover, its impact disappears when we control it for the other determinants 
of engagement (model 4). Finally, the perception by ecology activists of 
having free time to invest in collective action leads them to a higher level of 
participation. This factor is not significant in the case of the solidarity move-
ment. However, here we must note that the measure of this variable differs 
for the two groups. Specifically, we do not have a good indicator of the per-
ception of free time by BD members because the study measures the lack of 
free time in the context of not being more active in the organization, whereas 
in the WWF survey it refers to the perception that individuals held before 
joining the organization. For technical reasons, therefore, we cannot draw 
solid conclusions from this finding.11 
 Thus, when we look at social proximity as well as perceptions and inten-
tions, we find no fundamental difference; the role of these two stages in the 
route leading to activism is comparable for altruistic and self-oriented move-
ments alike. A substantial difference does exist in the impact of cultural prox-
imity, which is much stronger in the case of the WWF (model 1). This diver-
gence could result from the lower degree of homogeneity of this organiza-
tion. As previously noted, the WWF organizes summer camps for children, 
and this activity may help the WWF to expand its mobilization potential 
beyond the new social movements. Whereas the WWF attracts people beyond 
the cleavage articulated by the new social movements, ecology activists have 
a structural and cultural profile typical of the potential participants in those 
movements. Therefore we suspect that the difference in the weight of cultural 
factors in our comparison is due to a peculiar characteristic of the ecology 
organization under study, rather than to basically different processes leading 
to activism. 
 
Table 5.8 and 5.9 about here 
 
 To facilitate a more consistent comparison, model 5 in tables 5.8 and 5.9 
excludes from the analyses the variables pertaining to cultural proximity. 
This allows us to ascertain whether the two groups of activists show similar 
patterns of participation when we control for the specificity of the WWF on 
mobilization potential. The answer is yes. Without going into much detail, we 
can stress two points. First, the findings indicate that altruistic activists do not 
follow a distinct process of participation. The effect of social networks 
remains significant, for both the BD and the WWF. Specifically, socialization 
by organizational (formal) networks and recruitment by interpersonal (infor-
mal) networks lead to a stronger engagement. Second, individual effective-
ness continues to be significant, meaning that a positive evaluation of one’s 
own contribution continues to be significant and increases the chances of 
becoming an activist, in both altruistic and self-oriented movements. 
 
Political Altruism: Social Construction or Reality? 
 
Our analysis of the process leading to political altruism in general, and to 
activism in this type of contentious politics in particular, leads us to conclude 
that altruistic participants do not follow a distinct process of individual par-
ticipation. In other words, political altruism is not a phenomenon sui gene-
ris—a special form of political behavior that rests on distinct causal mecha-
nisms. Specifically, we see that involvement in social movements is not the 
result of a single key decision in which one assesses the costs and benefits of 
participation. It is rather the product of a more complex process in which 
perceptions and intentions do play an important role, but in which social 
relations also intervene in a decisive fashion. The most important finding for 
the present purpose, however, is that the nature of the protest issue and the 
orientation of the movement (altruistic or self-oriented) do not affect the 
process of individual participation. Such participation occurs through similar 
causal processes, regardless of the issue addressed and the orientation of the 
movement. This conclusion calls for further reflection about the supposed 
altruistic bases of the solidarity movement. Put another way, is the solidarity 
movement a genuine instance of political altruism? Isn’t it simply a disguised 
form of egoism, as it was often considered in certain theoretical perspectives? 
(See Tilly’s criticism in this volume.) For example, Wuthnow (1991) con-
cludes that “acts of compassion” in voluntary associations are, in fact, a way 
to gain self-fulfillment. Prosocial behavior would help individuals to “feel 
better” and to express their own individuality. In this context, therefore, it 
should be considered an act of disguised egoism. Hence the question: Is the 
solidarity movement, too, a channel for the self-fulfillment for people who 
participate to feel better or to obtain some kind of hidden rewards? 
A first way to answer this provocative question is examining whether partici-
pants get rewards once they are involved in the movement. Table 5.10 shows 
that members of the BD receive various compensations for their acts of soli-
darity. Virtually all of them say that their engagement in the organization 
gives them individual rewards. These rewards are mainly nonmaterial and 
represent a route toward self-fulfillment. Participation offers them the op-
portunity to acquire and develop new skills, realize their ideals, and gain a 
life experience. Here again, participants in the solidarity movement are not 
 different from those involved in the ecology movement; both get compensa-
tions for their political activities. Political altruism, then, seems to provide 
rewards. These findings hence support Wuthnow’s argument that acts of 
compassion contribute to self-fulfillment. Do they lead us to revise our view 
of the solidarity movement as an instance of political altruism? 
One of the characteristics of political altruism is to perform deeds without 
expecting any external reward, but now we see that participants in the soli-
darity movement do receive rewards. However, we must consider the defini-
tion of political altruism more carefully. The definition given in the introduc-
tion to this volume stresses that in order to be seen as altruistic, individuals 
do not have to expect any reward before they join the movement. In other 
words, they do not have to be motivated by individual rewards. Table 5.10 
indicates, in fact, that BD members receive compensations once they are 
already involved in the movement; they do not say that they were motivated 
by rewards to get involved in the first place. Although we lack quantitative 
data, we have qualitative information suggesting that altruistic participants 
were not motivated by individual rewards to act on behalf of others (Passy 
1998). Activists of the BD said during in-depth interviews that they were 
unaware beforehand of the potential gains on the private level to be drawn 
from their participation in the organization. They learned such rewards only 
after they first got involved in the movement. In the light of this statement, 
we can hardly consider participation in the solidarity movement as a form of 
disguised egoism. 
 
Table 10 about here 
 
 A second way to answer the question addressed above lies in sociological 
considerations. It is difficult to imagine that social actors receive nothing in 
return, whatever the purpose of their actions. Human action is not a one-way 
ticket, but rather an interactive process (Tilly 1996). Individuals get feedback 
that either encourages or discourages them to act again, independently of the 
type of action they are performing. It would be overly idealistic to say that in 
certain areas individuals receive nothing in return. Both altruistic and self-
oriented movement participants receive something from their actions, some-
thing we usually call “rewards.” Yet this does not allow us to conclude that 
political altruism is a form of disguised egoism. Every individual performing 
an action of this sort gets something in return. 
Here we might open a broader philosophical debate on the definition of po-
litical altruism. We refrain from the temptation to do so, and limit ourselves 
to a few concluding reflections. To think of altruistic acts in the absence of 
rewards or compensations is quite difficult in contemporary Western cul-
ture.12 As Mansbridge (1998) points out, “[l]ove (or some feeling of empathy 
or affinity with a group or individuals) and duty (or some form of commit-
ment to principle) are the two known forms of altruism, of which public spirit 
is a subset” (4). But the definition of the concept of public good (i.e., the 
public spirit) has been subject to much controversy and to historical as well 
as geographical variation. Since the time of Christian thinkers such as Augus-
tine and Aquinas in the Middle Ages, altruism has been a difficult idea to 
grasp, as they clearly held opposing views on the public good and the private 
good. This conflict was intensified in the eighteenth century by utilitarianism. 
Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action fits well into this philosophical and 
cultural background. Altruism—and, for that matter, any other kind of action 
lacking individual rewards—cannot be grasped intellectually. Yet this con-
ception of public and private goods as two opposed entities was preceded by 
quite a different view. For example, the ancient Greeks, notably Plato, saw 
public and private goods as compatible, positing that what is good for the 
public is naturally good for individuals as well. Similarly, Rousseau, who 
was strongly influenced by Greek thinkers, did not consider these two entities 
opposed to each other, for human beings are social actors inclined toward the 
public good. As a consequence, what is good for individuals is naturally good 
for people collectively. Adam Smith also saw compatibility between the 
public good and private interests, insofar as private advantages are inevitably 
transformed in public advantages through the “invisible hand.” 
These examples, borrowed from Mansbridge’s (1998) discussion of the 
contested boundaries of the public good, show that our appraisal of political 
altruism—which can be defined as a contribution to producing collective 
goods without receiving individual rewards—is contingent upon the philo-
sophical view of the human being we endorse. Today we still largely share 
the opposition between public goods and private interests which was handed 
down by early Christian thinkers and utilitarianism, and which leads us to 
think in such terms as: if people do something for the public good, it is be-
cause they think they will get something in return, something we usually call 
“rewards.” Otherwise it is irrational do so. This way of thinking puts us in a 
poor position to judge prosocial behavior. It also prevents us from seeing that 
individuals may act altruistically driven by hopes of social change, moral 
obligations, or another internalized altruistic principle or norm. Instead of 
saying that political altruism exists or not depending on what view of the 
human being we adhere to, instead of falling into a sterile discussion that 
resembles Pandora’s box, we think it more fruitful to examine the processes 
that lead to this type of behavior with the aim of bringing its peculiarities to 
the fore and hence reach a better understanding of social processes in general. 
 
Notes 
 TABLE 5.1 
Distribution of BD and WWF Members by Class 
(Compared to the Swiss Population) 
 
 BD 
Members 
WWF 
members 
Swiss 
population a 
Bourgeoisie/old middle class 14 11 19 
Free professionals (independent)   9   7   8 
Employers/craftsmen   4   3   7 
Peasants   1   1   4 
New middle class 76 66 48 
Social-cultural specialists 59 45 14 
Technocrats 16 19 14 
Managers   1   2 20 
Labor class 12 23 34 
Specialized workers/employees   3   6 23 
Nonspecialized workers/employees   9 17 11 
Total         100%         100%         100% 
N         599         535       2807 
a Bütschi (1997). 
 
TABLE 5.2 
Distribution of BD and WWF Members by Partisan Preference 
(Compared to the Swiss Population) 
 
 BD 
members 
WWF 
Members 
Swiss 
population a 
Extreme left   5   3   1 
Extreme left/Socialist party   3   3 — 
Socialist party 33 23 21 
Left/Greens  34 33 — 
Greens 10 22   6 
Left/right   2   3 — 
Religious-based parties   5   4 15 
Right   3   8 30 
Other/no partisan preference   3   3 28 
Total         100%         100%         100% 
N         566         540       2022 
a Analyses Vox (no. 49, 51, 53). 
 TABLE 5.3 
Distribution of BD and WWF Members by Value Scale 
(Compared to the Swiss Population) 
 
 BD 
Members 
WWF 
Members 
Swiss 
Population a 
Postmaterialist 89 61 22 
Mixed, prevailingly postmaterialist   7 22 28 
Mixed, prevailingly materialist   4 15 31 
Materialist   0   3 19 
Total         100%         100%         100% 
N         547         469       2416 
a Bütschi (1997). 
 
TABLE 5.4 
Distribution of BD and WWF Members by Social Network Function 
 
 BD 
members 
WWF 
members 
Socialization   
No networks 11   4 
Formal networks only   9   8 
Informal networks only 44 29 
Formal and informal networks 36 60 
Total               100%               100% 
N               646               670 
Recruitment   
No networks 41 61 
Formal networks only 23   5 
Informal networks only 23 30 
Formal and informal networks 13   4 
Total               100%               100% 
N               646               670 
 
  
TABLE 5.5 
Distribution of BD and WWF Members by Network Type (Percentages) 
 
 Members of formal 
networks before 
joining the BD 
Members of formal 
networks before 
joining the WWF 
New social movements 50 47 
Ecology movement 23 27 
Third World organizations 20 20 
Human rights organizations   9 10 
Student associations   1   8 
Peace movement   6   7 
Antinuclear movement   4   6 
Women’s movement   3   2 
Asylum/immigration organizations   2   3 
Antiracist organizations   1   2 
Conventional political networks 21 20 
Unions 19 15 
Parties   5   8 
Employers’ associations —   2 
Religious networks 11 11 
Other networks 35 43 
Youth associations   1 17 
Charity associations   5 11 
Other associations   3 10 
Consumers’ associations   4   8 
Scientific associations   5   6 
Renters’ associations   4   5 
Neighborhood associations   2   4 
Pupils’ parents associations   1   4 
Patriotic/military associations —   1 
N               646               670 
Percentages do not total 100 because data drawn from multiple-choice questions. 
 
TABLE 5.6 
Mean of Perceived Effectiveness by BD and WWF Members 
 
 BD 
members 
WWF 
members 
Individual effectiveness 2.71 (617) 3.31 (652) 
Collective effectiveness 4.00 (615) 4.02 (657) 
5-point scale (1 = no sense of effectiveness, 5 = strong sense of effectiveness); num-
ber of cases in parentheses. 
 TABLE 5.7 
Evaluation of Authorities and Citizens’ Capacity to Act 
by BD and WWF Members 
 
 BD 
members 
WWF 
members 
Delegitimation of authorities/ 
legitimation of citizens 
47 39 
Legitimation of authorities/ 
legitimation of citizens 
31 39 
Delegitimation of authorities/ 
delegitimation of citizens 
18 16 
Legitimation of authorities/ 
delegitimation of citizens 
  5 10 
Total               100%               100% 
N               646               670 
 
TABLE 5.8 
Logistic Regression of BD Activists on the Determinants of Participation (Odds 
Ratios) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Cultural Proximity      
Social-cultural specialists           2.087             1.211  
New middle class (other)           2.300             3.099  
Workers           1.446             1.339  
Partisan preference           1.355***             1.739  
Postmaterialism             .668             1.419  
Social Proximity      
Embedded in formal networks close to the movement            2.332***            3.525***           3.468*** 
Embedded in other formal networks              .932              .916             .972 
Embedded in informal networks            1.569***            1.474           1.377 
Recruited by formal networks            1.615*            2.208           1.543 
Recruited by informal networks            3.346***            5.908***           5.591*** 
Perceptions and intentions      
Interest in the issue             1.803**           1.587           1.545 
Individual effectiveness             2.146***           2.239***           2.103*** 
Collective effectiveness               .777             .763             .729 
Delegitimation of authorities/legitimation of citizens               .778             .767             .814 
Objective availability             1.353           1.977**           1.850* 
Subjective availability             1.146           1.247           1.226 
−2 Log likelihood 503.105 614.438 294.695 173.169 204.741 
R2 (Nagelkerke)             .032             .199             .251             .452             .414 
N       436       534       264       222       258 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 TABLE 5.9 
Logistic Regression of WWF Activists on the Determinants of Participation 
(Odds Ratios) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Cultural Proximity      
Social-cultural specialists             .724               .610  
New middle class (other)             .923             1.326  
Workers             .386               .284  
Partisan preference           3.660***             3.555***  
Postmaterialism           1.746***             1.652*  
Social Proximity      
Embedded in formal networks close to the movement            1.797***            1.249           1.875*** 
Embedded in other formal networks               .817**              .840             .826 
Embedded in informal networks            1.100            1.058           1.014 
Recruited by formal networks            1.169              .809             .811 
Recruited by informal networks            2.260***            1.890           2.352** 
Perceptions and intentions      
Interest in the issue             1.868**           1.446           1.731* 
Individual effectiveness             1.701***           1.787***           1.662*** 
Collective effectiveness               .831             .953             .938 
Delegitimation of authorities/legitimation of citizens             1.000             .881             .916 
Objective availability               .987             .969             .960 
Subjective availability             1.389**           1.607***           1.435*** 
−2 Log likelihood 444.201 719.065 436.799 317.071 436.799 
R2 (Nagelkerke)             .200             .124             .224             .424             .317 
N       508       524       317       231       307 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
TABLE 5.10 
Rewards Received by BD and WWF Members  
from Engagement in the Organizations (Percentages) a 
 
 BD 
Members 
WWF 
Members 
Has received rewards from engagement 84 92 
Material   
Participate in actions in the field — b 36 
Provides outlets for a future job 17 33 
Benefit from special offers given to members — 19 
Self-fulfillment   
Acquire skills 72 88 
Realize own ideals — 74 
Belong to a group that shares own ideals 33 48 
Meet new friends 40 42 
Acquire recognition from friends   9 10 
Life experience 61 — 
Give meaning to life 49 — 
N         646         670 
a Percentages do not total 100 because data drawn from multiple-choice questions. 
b Not measured. 
 
 
 
